

Discussion: “Optimal Design of Tokenized Markets”

Michael Lee, Antoine Martin, & Robert Townsend

Chaojun Wang


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
Tokenization requires specific meeting orders & causes hold up problem

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
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

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

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
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


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
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
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Tokenization $\equiv$ Instant Settlement

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Companion paper Zero settlement risk token system $\Longleftrightarrow$ Instant settlement

This paper Proposition 4 (p.34): State-contingent programs reintroduce settlement risk

Move to Proposition 0?

Fundamental tension between settlement risk and holdup

- Remove settlement risk requires immediate settlement
- Immediate settlement worsens holdup


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- Remove settlement risk requires immediate settlement
- Immediate settlement worsens holdup
- Legacy system: Maximum settlement risk & minimum holdup
- Zero-settlement-risk token system: Minimum settlement risk & maximum holdup


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- Remove settlement risk requires immediate settlement
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- Legacy system: Maximum settlement risk & minimum holdup
- Zero-settlement-risk token system: Minimum settlement risk & maximum holdup
- Optimal balance between settlement risk & holdup?
 - ▶ Legacy system: penalty for settlement failure
 - ▶ Token system: varying degree of state contingency


Match making - a joint solution to holdup and settlement risk?




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
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Match making - a joint solution to holdup and settlement risk?



- Zero settlement risk: no trades occur in the worst case scenario
- Doesn't worsen holdup relative to the legacy system

Summary

Conceptually deep paper

Main suggestions:

- Explain zero settlement risk $\iff$ immediate settlement earlier
- Emphasize the fundamental tension between settlement risk & holdup
- Rule out match making as a joint solution to settlement risk & holdup